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IN THE SUPREME COURT

of the
STATE OF UTAH

RELIANCE NATIONAL
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,

)

Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

Case No.
)

10,003

\VILLIAM P. HANSEN,
Defendant and Respondent.

)

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
Reliance National Life Insurance Company, plaintiff in the lower court, appealed from a judgement, of the

Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County,
granting defendant William P. Hansen "no cause of action"
from the plaintiff's claim and, further, granting defend-

ant's counterclaim for monies due him by virtue of an

additional contract of employment for commissions

earned and for the sale of an airplane by the defendant
to the plaintiff.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the Court, resulting in a judg~
ment for the defendant of"no cause of action on plaintiff's
complaint" and the awarding of $3,500.00 on two separate
counts of defendant's counterclaim, from which the plaintiff appeals. The Court further found that the portion of
the original contract dealing with the sale of the airplane
was severable from the contract as a whole; that subsequent commissions were earned aftertheoriginalcontract
of employment was terminated. The plaintiff appeals on
the grounds that the judgement of the lower court is not
supported by the Findings of Fact.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent, being defendant in the lower court, seeks
to uphold the judgment of the lower court granting the
"no cause of action" on plaintiff's complaint and the award
in favor of the defendant on two separate counts of defendant's counterclaim.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent accepts the appellant's Statement of
Facts as outlined in "Plaintiff's Brief' as being in substantial conformity with the Findings of Fact entered by
the Court, with the following exceptions:
1. The defendant presented evidence which showed
that the plaintiff did not take diligent care to inquire into
the background and history of the defendant when the
plaintiff had opportunity of ascertaining such background of the defendant, and the defendant requested
the plaintiff to do so.
2. Respondent does not admit hereby that the representations charged to respondent were false; and fur-
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ther, respondent does not agree that appellant has suffered any damage by reason thereof.

Respondent feels that although appellant has divided
its argument into three points, all three points in reality
relate to the same legal principles. Therefore, respondent
will not answer appellant's arguments point by point,
but will answer all points raised in "Plaintiff's Brief''
under Point II hereof.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I. THE CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT
BETWEEN THE PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT
WAS NOT TERMINATED BECAUSE OF ANY MISREPRESENTATION BUT WAS TERMINATED ON
OTHER GROUNDS, and THEREFORE NO DAMAGES NOR RESCISSION FOR FRAUD OR MISREPRESENTATION CAN BE CLAIMED BY THE
PLAINTIFF.
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY
RULED THAT THE CONTRACT FOR THE SALE
OF THE AIRPLANE, and DEFENDANT'S CLAIM
FOR COMMISSIONS WERE SEVERABLE FROM THE
BASIC CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT
BETWEEN THE PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT
\VAS NOT TERMINATED BECAUSE OF ANY MISREPRESENTATION BUT WAS TERMINATED ON
OTHER GROUNDS, AND THEREFORE NO DAMAGES NOR RESCISSION FOR FRAUD OR MISREPRESENTATION CAN BE CLAIMED BY THE
PLAINTIFF.
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The trial court's Findings of Fact No. 9 set forth
the reason for which defendant's employment contract
was terminated by plaintiff as follows:
"9. The contract of employment between plaintiff and
defendant, as set forth in Finding of Fact No. B.
was terminated by plaintiff for cause due to the
following acts of the defendant:
a. The defendant was directed to sell the aforesaid airplane and made no effort to do so.
b. The defendant was instructed not to approach
the insurance department of the State of Idaho in
regard to the Estate Accumulator Policy. Nevertheless, the defendant did consult with that department with negative results totheprejudiceofplaintiff.
c. Defendant was instructed not to sell a participating policy which was being designed by plaintiff
until the policy had been approved by plaintiff's
actuary. Nevertheless, defendant proceeded to sell
this policy before approval from the actuary was
obtained.
d. Defendant was instructed not to control any
insurance department regarding approval of the
Estate Accumulator policy, but to leave this matter
in the hands of the actuary for plaintiff. Nevertheless, defendant wrote the Insurance Commissioner
of the State of Washington regarding approval of
this policy with adverse results to plaintiff.
e. Defendant was instructed not to use the company airplane for personal business, but nevertheless did use the airplane for personal business.
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This finding clearly shows that the plaintiff did not
terminate the defendant's contract because of fraud or
any alleged misrepresentation but rather on other
grounds. 'rherefore, the lower court was correct in denying the plaintiff damages or rescission on the grounds
of fraud, inasmuch as fraud was not alleged nor found
to be related to the cause of the termination of the
employment contract.
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY
HULED THAT THE CONTRACT FOR THE SALE
OF THE AIRPLANE, AND DEFENDANT'S CLAIM
FOR COMMISSIONS WERE SEVERABLE FROM
THE BASIC CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT.
In its brief appellant cites the case of Taylor vs.
Moore, et al, 51 P.2d 222, 87 Utah 493, and contends
that it stands for the proposition that a contract induced by fraud is voidable at the option of the party
injured by the fraud. However, this reflects only a
portion of the holding in that case, and was taken
out of context. Further reading of the Taylor case
~hows that the Court held that a person who has the
opportunity of knowing facts constituting alleged fraud
cannot be inactive and afterwards allege want of knowledge arising by reason of his negligence or laches.
In this case, the evidence clearly shows that the plaintiff, or its president, Salisbury, did not investigate defendant's references. AssetforthinFindingofFact No.4:
" . . . Salisbury made no search of defendant's
past record." Further, from Salisbury's testimony at
trial, and the testimony of the defendant, it appears
that Salisbury had opportunity to check into the background of the defendant and was implored to do so by
the defendant himself. It seems then, the plaintiff did
not exercise diligent care to check into the background
of the defendant
Hansen, and thereby is guilty of
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laches and precluded from later raising this objectic,
against the defendant. This also seems implicit in th\
findings of the trial court that defendant was dis barged
for cause, and not by reason of any misrepresentations
made at the time of his employment.
It is interesting to note that the Taylor c.ase, as
cited by the appellant, is quite explicit on the duties of
the person complaining of fraud to investigate facts
constituting the alleged fraud. Therefore, the trial court's
finding in Finding of Fact No. 5, that Salisbury did
not know until three months later of any misrepresentations, is indicative of the plaintiff's inaction and
negligence in checking on the representations of the
defendant.
Notwithstanding the fact that fraud might be found
in the basic employment contract, the question that is
foremost before this Court is whether or not such fraud
affected the agreement for the sale of the airplane and
the payment of the defendant of commissions earned
subsequent to the termination of the basic employment
contract. There have been several tests outlined by the
courts and legal texts to determine whether or not
portions of contracts are severable and whether, if the
contracts are found to be severable, fraud in one portion
would travel to other portions of the contracts. The
general rule seems to be that the tests for severability
evolve upon intention, divisibility of subject matter, and
apportionment of consideration (See 17 A Corpus Juris
Secundum, Contracts Sees. 331-335.) With respect to the
instant case each test is met as follows:
1. Intention: It is clear from the evidence that the
intention was to make a separate contract for the
sale of the airplane on terms different from the
defendant's employment contract. This is evidenced
by the fact that from the outset plaintiff was in-
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terested in the possibility of re-sale of this aircraft,
even though its intention was that the defendant
would still be working for plaintiff. Therefore, it
appears that the intention of both the plaintiff and
thtl defendant was that the disposition of the aircraft would not automatically terminate defendant's employment contract with plaintiff. Thus, the
parties clearly intended the contract to be severable.
(See Baker vs. Jones, 240 P. 2d 1165, 1171; 69
Wyo. 314.)

2. Divisibility of Subject Matter: It is clear from the

record that the plaintiff and defendant were dealing
with two different subject matters, to wit: insurance
sales vis-a-vis the sale of an airplane. The case of
Coppedge vs. Leiser, 229 P. 2d 977, 71 Ida. 248,
outlines the divisibility of subject matter as a valid
test to determine the severability of portions of a
contract. It is clear from the record that this contract in question meets the tests of divisibility of
subject matter, and therefore the sale of the airplane
and the commissions paid are severable from the
basic employment contract.

3. The Apportionment of Consideration and Method
of Payment: The rule that where a contract calls for
a different mode of payment or an apportionment
of consideration among different parties, schedule
of payment or apportionment is a valid criteria upon
which to base a decision that portions of the contract
are severable from one another. In the cases of
Simmons vs. California Institute of Technology,
209 P. 2d 589, 34 C. 2d 264, and Sweet vs. Watson's Nurseries, 73 P. 2d 284, 23 Cal. App 379,
the test was outlined whereby apportionment of
consideration was used to determine that portions
of interests were severable. Applying this to the
present case, the basic employment contract called
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for one means of compensation for the purchase
of the aircraft, to and including continued payments to a third party for future payments on the
aircraft, and a separate means of compensation
to the defendant for duties as a Sales Manager.
As to the sale of policies after termination of the
basic employment contract, still another method
of compensation and mode of payment was devsed.

It is the respondent's argument that, based upon
the tests as outlined above and the tests as outlined in
12 Am. Jur. Contracts 315-316, the case at hand clearly
fits within the rule that even though an agreement embrace several particulars about one affair and be reached
through one agreement, it may yet have the nature and
operation of several different contracts and be treated
as severable portions of a basic contract. U. S. vs.
Bethlehem Steel Corporation, 315 U. S. 389, 86 L. ed.
855, 62 S. Ct. 581.
Since the agreements pertaining to the sale of the
airplane and to the commissions earned after termination of the employment contract are severable from
the basic employment contract, any fraud that may
exist with respect to the basic employment contract
does not carry over and apply to the severable portions.
Any misrepresentation as to the basic contract was not
material as to the severable portions, and therefore
should not apply so as to make voidable those portions
of the contract dealing with the sale of the airplane
and the commissions earned. (See Hecht vs. Metzler,
14 Utah 408, 48 Pac. 37.)
Furthermore, there was no fraud proved or even
alleged in the lower court as to the sale of the airplane.
In light of the case of U. S. vs. Arrendondo, 6 Pet.
(U.S.) 691, 8 L. ed. 547, the fraud must be relevant
to the subject matter of the contract in order to apply.
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With respect to the $1,000.00 awarded respondent
for commissions earned subsequent to the termination
of respondent's employment contract, respondent asserts
that appellant has accepted the benefits of sales giving
rise to the commissions and that to permit appellant to
defeat respondent's claim thereto by reason of some
unrelated misrepresentations will unjustly enrich appellant. The trial court found the amount of commissions
earned subsequent to the termination of the basic employment contract to be $1,000.00. This is supported
by evidence in the record, as set forth in the extract
quoted on page 18 of appellant's brief. It is true that
appellant presented conflicting evidence. However, appellant did not object to respondent's testimony and the
trial judge chose to believe the evidence of the defendant
supporting this amount. The respondent believes the
fmdings of the trial judge, that the amount in dispute
was actually $1,000.00 owed to the defendant, should
be upheld on the ground that the trial judge was in the
best position to observe and determine the reliability of
the witnesses and the accuracy of the evidence offered
by them.
CONCLUSION
The respondent respectfully submits, that the fmdings and decisions of the lower court were reasonable
and in accordance with law; and further submits that
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law should
be upheld.
Respectfully submitted,
TUFT AND MARSHALL
GEORGE SMITH DIBBLE, JR., of Counsel
Attorneys for Respondent-Defendant
53 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah
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